In 1813 Sarah Spencer (daughter of Lord Spencer a leading Whig politician) married William Lyttelton and a few months later they set out on a tour of Sweden and Russia. In St Petersburg that December she noted a conversation with Admiral Chichagov who had commanded the southern Russian army in the campaign of 1812, and who was evidently feeling disgruntled at having been removed from his position. As her Correspondence is not the obvious place for anyone to look for accounts of the campaign I thought it might be worthwhile to post it here:
‘Admiral Tschitchagoff very shrewd, keen, quick man, frondeur I suppose tells truth. Said frost did all last year; skill nothing. French decidedly victorious as far as Moscow, which place Koutousoff pledged “his white hair” to defend to the last. Did he defend it? If it had been intended to sacrifice it, why not give notice to the inhabitants? Why not empty the town? Why leave it full of the most useful ammunition? Why not take the Kaluga position before the French went to Moscow, which must have stopped them? Le grand merit! After he had evacuated the capital, to begin proclaiming that “Moscow n’est pas las Russie.” N.B. – Said proclamation has always been stated to us has having been writtenavant coupas aprojetfor the sacrifice of Moscow, not as an apology, as it now turns out to have been.Borodino a signal defeat of the Russians. Koutousoff’s parallel march nonsense; he kept a hundred versts behind the French, and therefore they were not destroyed as they [might] have been at the Beresina. Koutousoff a sleepy old man, up only six hours in the twenty-four; always unsuccessful and unskillful amidst all manner of advantages last year. Russian people very brave fighters always.’ (Diary 27 December 1813 inCorrespondence of Sarah Spencer, Lady Lytteltonp 179-80)
Dear Paul, thanks for the publication details.
Alex Mikaberidze's book goes through the entire issue very thoroughly, including memoirs from Chichagov and many others, as well as a host of unpublished material. Excellent history: allows one to assess the complex situation and draw one's own conclusions.
It might be useful to see what Tchitchagoff (or Chichagov, the spelling varies) has to say himself about these events. His memoirs were published in French in Leipzig in 1862 under the title Mémoirs de l'amiral Tchitchagoff, and about 3/4 of the book deals withe campaing in Russia.
Thanks for that, Rory!
Plenty of "blame" to go around on this one on the Russian side. Highly recommend Alex Mikaberidze's fine book for a thoughtful, objective treatment of this issue.
yes he made mistakes - but worse than Kutusow or the over hyped Wittgenstein?
According to Mikaberidze the worst mistake he did was not to destroy the road through the swampy areas at this side of the Beresina - leading to the west.
Seemingly there was no concentrated effort between those three military commanders to encircle the remainders of the Grande Armée.
Hmm, I think there's an argument to say that he was negligent is scouting north of Borisov and culpable for not destroying the causeways at Zembin. He was a scapegoat, but he also made mistakes.
Very interesting. The grapes seem a little sour with this one, but he makes some valid points, especially about evacuating Moscow. The Beresina, however, is a disaster of the admiral's own making.