The Limits of the Operational Art of War 1812, by Alexander Mikaberidze, pp.372
in Napoleon and the Operational Art of War.
Also for Anglophones, Duffy : Eagle over the Alps and
Carl von Clausewitz - Napoleon Absent, Coalition Ascendant - The 1799 Campaign in Italy and Switzerland, volume I - translated and edited vy N. Murray and C. Pringle.
The Battle at the Trebbia. Suvorov's fierce pursuit completely destroyed McDonald's army. In 1813, Moreau arrived at the Allied headquarters. A Russian officer asked him about Suvorov's performance in 1799. Moreau acknowledged that Suvorov’s march to the Trebbia was the sublimity of military art(les sublime de l’ art militaire)
Read Zhmodikov，Tactics of the Russian Army in the Napoleonic Wars Volume 2 by Alexander for reference.
outsmarting Nabulieone in strategic terms, finding a way how to deal with his system of war efficiently and inflicting to him a defeat of catastrophic size.
The policy of retreat in 1812; Ordered by Barclay and obeyed by his subordinates. Yes I know about many of them disagreeing with and at times plotting against him, but it was still ultimately obeyed. It used Napoleon's gambling and bold nature against him, contributing to the campaign becoming drawn out, allowing the grand army to suffer from attrition.
@Daniel Ross After the abandonment of the Drissa camp, the Russian strategic picture was confusion augmented by distrust and incompetence. Even after Smolensk there was not plan to draw the French deeper into Russia.
@Kevin F. Kiley I know the russian retreat is essentially this:
General von Phull's plan being abandoned due to its obvious flaws.
Barclay and Bagration resolving to join up, which they do at Smolensk (where battle is given).
Barclay ordering a retreat again from Smolensk.
The iron cord running through this entire part of the campaign is the option of retreat, which Barclay (along with Kutaisov and Platov) supports and constantly orders. Barclay's actions of issuing these orders multiple times and his subordinates ultimately obeying said orders is the greatest russian success in my opinion.
In case the Russians were so incompetent and useless as well as confused, I wonder why Nabulieone did not catch up with them and destroyed their army? The plain truth is that he had no strategic vision how to wage this campaign and blundered all the times forward,
With the exception of the Berezina where Kutusov deliberately refused to support Tshitshagov and Wittgenstein.
'Look, brother Aleksei Petrovich, don't get too carried away and take care of our Guards regiments. We have done our bit and now it's Chichagov's turn.'
Kutusov to Yermelov before the battle of the Berezina.
Kutusov's pursuit of Napoleon was half-hearted at best and he was never able to bring Napoleon to a decisive battle during the retreat of the Grande Armee.
Further for the Russian Campaign, see Carl von Clausewitz The Campaign of 1812 in Russia:
The Campaign Of 1812 In Russia: Von Clausewitz, General Carl: 9780306806506: Amazon.com: Books
Clausewitz has some interesting comments on senior Russian officers as he served with them in 1812.
For an excellent synopsis for 1812
The Limits of the Operational Art of War 1812, by Alexander Mikaberidze, pp.372
in Napoleon and the Operational Art of War.
Also for Anglophones, Duffy : Eagle over the Alps and
Carl von Clausewitz - Napoleon Absent, Coalition Ascendant - The 1799 Campaign in Italy and Switzerland, volume I - translated and edited vy N. Murray and C. Pringle.
Excellent references and essential to understand the Russian army of the period.
The Battle at the Trebbia. Suvorov's fierce pursuit completely destroyed McDonald's army. In 1813, Moreau arrived at the Allied headquarters. A Russian officer asked him about Suvorov's performance in 1799. Moreau acknowledged that Suvorov’s march to the Trebbia was the sublimity of military art(les sublime de l’ art militaire)
Read Zhmodikov，Tactics of the Russian Army in the Napoleonic Wars Volume 2 by Alexander for reference.
outsmarting Nabulieone in strategic terms, finding a way how to deal with his system of war efficiently and inflicting to him a defeat of catastrophic size.
The policy of retreat in 1812; Ordered by Barclay and obeyed by his subordinates. Yes I know about many of them disagreeing with and at times plotting against him, but it was still ultimately obeyed. It used Napoleon's gambling and bold nature against him, contributing to the campaign becoming drawn out, allowing the grand army to suffer from attrition.
Tactically it was Suvorovs Victories slicing through French Armies like Butter. Strategically it was 1812