The Sepoy-General’s Inspiration: Wellington's Importation of Imperial Military Innovation to European Warfare
Huw J. Davies
It cannot be denied that the principles of manoeuvre pursued by Wellington in 1813, more closely resemble Napoleon’s approach, than it does the previously cautious, defensive stance the British had adopted in Portugal and Spain between 1808 and 1811. However, such a conclusion overlooks the fact that Wellington had never encountered Napoleon, or his particular style of manoeuvre warfare in Portugal or Spain, and was unlikely to have discussed the finer details of Napoleon’s operational and tactical techniques with anyone who had encountered them. Moreover, it also ignores Wellington’s experience of South Asian Warfare between 1798 and 1804. This paper will argue that for a true understanding of the doctrinal origins of Wellington’s 1813 offensive, we must look to his understanding and experience of warfare against the indigenous armies of India, for it is here that he developed operational doctrine that more closely resembled his plans and actions in 1813 than any other aspect of his career.