Hi All…
Firstly, I’d like to thank Zack and Admin for their help concerning my first post:
Please note that the following has a copyright:
I will try to be as clear as possible concerning the forces on the ground, their activities, their mishaps and my objectives. Because of it, I apologize for the post being rather long.
As the storyline progresses, I’ll periodically integrate remarks validating the reason as to why I believe these men were wrongly accused and wrongly punished. The result, and your comments will be presented to the Ministry of Defence, with the aim of recovering their prestige; including their well-deserved Waterloo Medals for their respective Regiments.
MOD comment: The term ‘Courts-martial’ is not a punishment. The system is simply a military procedure in order to present the facts and have the Judges decide if a punishment should be carried out. In this case, all were punished in one way or another.
Only two men were sentenced to 300 lashes each for ‘cowardice,’ however, the remainder suffered loss of dignity, rank, promotions, a career, Waterloo Money, their names as ‘Waterloo Men’ and some, the added trauma of PTSD…, simply because they did not make it back in time before the closure of the North Gate.
As you can imagine…, a total scandal ! Initiated by a tantrum-motivated Officer because he didn’t have the required number of troops needed to garrison the farm.
As you will see, not only did these brave men stand their ground, but in doing so, they enabled the others to return to the farm unhindered. And in doing so…, they, probably saved the day !
In relation to all 3 Regiments…, I will use their modern-day abbreviations.
(Grenadier Guards GG / Scots Guards SG / Coldstream Guards CG)
Before I start, I’d like to thank John Franklin for providing me with the basic details of this event. Supplementary facts will be found in his book ‘The Struggle for Hougoumont.’ However, I was doing publicity throughout the Brigade in 2015 for this book and as John is now working with a New Zealand Director for a new Waterloo film; we may have to wait until 2021.
In the meantime, if he ever gets to read this, perhaps parts of it might help him with the mise-en-scene.
An overall view of the Hougoumont morning:
Firstly, I’d like to get something off my chest ! The battle did not start at 11h35; Wellington tells us in his Dispatch that it started at 10h00. (as per Napoleons’ wishes)
In addition, the term a “battle within a battle” is poppycock !
Now, with that out of the way, I must mention that there were only two breaches of the North Gate…, no more, no less ! Following the second and as the saying goes, (especially for the Guards) ‘once bitten, twice shy;’ means that the damaged North Gate would have been permanently barricaded for the remainder of the day, using farm equipment from the outhouses. In addition, the manpower for the northern platforms and loopholes would obviously have been stepped up. Of course, the northern courtyard ‘day’ is relatively short, because of the fires. As such, no Enemy in their right mind would have made a third attempt during the blaze.
As for the wounded; they would have used the exit through the formal garden’s hedge and following the fires, just after 13h00, Brewster, pulling gunpowder, would certainly have avoided the courtyard. So, he too would have used the orchard strip to unload.
(meaning that we can now eliminate the ‘spiced up’ painting !)
Concerning the other two breaches we know about:
The third would have been via the western byre door commanded by Lieutenant Sylvian Toulouse of the 2nd Btn 2e Régiment d'Infanterie de Ligne. (not soldiers of the 1st Léger) Meaning, that if there was a French Drummer Boy, he would certainly not have been with 1st Léger ! (skirmishers do not have drummers)
During this incursion, a distinction was added to Private William West’s service record for gallantry (SG) for the service he rendered at this moment in the byre. Offered probably for killing Toulouse and recommended to Dashwood in the Bruxelles hospital (alongside Capt. Evelyn) by Captain Erlington, who had been in charge of the group in the byre.
The fourth breach was the southern gate when the Enemy finally managed to get a howitzer into the paddock. (due to the fact that the French Horse Artillery were unable to move north through the wood) This bombardment damaged the south gate and tore a hole in the upstairs wall of the gardener’s house. Both incursions were unsuccessful !
Now, getting back to the Courts-martial: During the first breech of the North Gate, no Guards were involved because both the SG and CG Light Companies were in and along the wood’s northern perimeter. Lt. Col. Macdonnell on his charger oversaw the morning’s operation, and he had another two Lt Cols; Dashwood (SG) and Wyndham (CG) who were in charge of the two attack platoons.
The tactics :
So…, we have two Companies involved: (SG and CG) For easiness sake, we’ll say that each company has about 120 men. As usual, the company is divided in two to create two platoons…, one being the attack platoon while the other remains to the rear in support.
However, when in action, the attack platoon is once again divided into two sections. One becomes the advanced attack section, while the other support section remains behind them with their CO, other Officers, the Bugler and their Men. The job of the support section is to ensure that the dead, the wounded and those short of ammo are replaced. In the meantime, with the support PLATOON to the rear, their job is to keep the support section up to strength.
During such an advance, (in a wooded area) the attack sections advance ‘in chain.’ (taken from Rotenberg’s manual of military tactics and explained to me by Rod MacArthur. Thanks Rod; I only hope I well understood. Please correct me if I’m wrong.)
Advancing ‘in chain’ can be quite a complicated affair but in this case, because of the medieval wood and its easy manoeuvrability, it simply means that the men are in extended line. Meaning that with 2 attack sections numbering about 60 men, and depending on their spacing, they’d nearly span the width of the wood.
Note: The west side of the wood (the kitchen garden side) is particularly crowded with Enemy due to the closeness of the exterior hedge and rye field. (the SG being the closest, while the CG are to the east, near the paddock) This left/right position is ‘determined’ by the fact that Matthew Clay describes in detail, the haystack on the pastureland. (this being the ‘Killing Ground’) Meaning that the support platoons are immediately behind their respective COs.
Note: Indirectly, Clay also tells us here that the haystack is positioned near the kitchen garden; not near the crossroads to the east of the pastureland. Said, because later, he says; “suddenly, finding ourselves alone.” Had the stack been to the east near the lanes, then they would have witnessed the Guards during their retreat. However, during the mayhem, this was apparently not the case !
The situation:
During Wellington’s second visit, he orders Lord Saltoun and his two GG Light Companies to the rear, while at the same time, transferring the CG from the farm and the SG from the sunken lane; with both being redeployed to the western kitchen garden. All three vacated positions are then reinforced with about 800 Dutch and German troops.
This must have been about 09h00 because they were already in position for 10h00; as Captain Büsgen tells us that it needed some time to get the new arrivals installed throughout the farm. In addition, Clay also tells us that the Guards remained kneeling along the garden’s hedgerow for a “considerable length of time.”
At 10h00; Wellington sees the smoke from hundreds of muskets and rifles, billowing towards him from the southern hedgerow of the paddock and the southern orchard. (at 3 rounds per minute per man)
This southerly wind is EXTREMELY important…, and it’s confirmed by Wellington when writing a letter to Macdonnell, saying that “the fire has spread from the southern haystack to the great barn.” Impossible, of course…, but from the ridge, it probably looked that way. In the meantime, what he’s really telling us here is the direction of the wind !
Lol…, something has just occurred to me ! Wellington was no fool; and to write a letter saying that the barn is ablaze BECAUSE of the southern haystack would have been ridiculous; had the French Horse Artillery already commenced their bombardment. Had the bombardment already started, then he wouldn’t have blamed the haystack !
This means that both the haystack and the barn were accidently ignited by 3 ‘flashes in the pan’ per minute; by each defender firing from the rafters and through the barn’s ventilation holes.
No straw in the chateau…, so that building was set on fire by the artillery.
The 3 platoons are now kneeling in line along the western garden’s hedgerow. (on the other side of this hedge is the western rye field and more French skirmishers are approaching)
Dashwood is probably level with the SW corner of the gardener’s house. Kneeling further south would have been imprudent, not just because of the Allied rifles in the gardener’s house; but from this position, the white horse of Cubières could probably be seen milling about, near the northern perimeter of the southern orchard.
Behind Dashwood’s attack platoon is Wyndham’s attack platoon. And behind Wyndham is Dashwood’s support platoon commanded by Ensign Standen. Among Standen’s 60-odd men is Sgt Ralph Fraser carrying his halberd. A halberd, (or half pike) because that morning, he belonged to HQ Company and was transferred at the same time as the Allies; otherwise, he would have had a musket like all the other Light Company sergeants. Also with him are Matthew Clay plus his Old Soldier Robert Gann. (Gann…, to become Wellington’s future servant at ‘Number One London’; Wesley House) In those days, the soldiers usually worked in pairs; one learning from the other.
To the rear and lining the farm’s northern wall is Wyndham’s support platoon, commanded by Ensign Gooch…, he’s along this wall because the hedgerow in the garden is not long enough. (especially with the northern tip of the garden being under water) Had it not been under water, there may have been enough room for his platoon.
Note: Near the water’s edge is a clover stack which Clay and Gann will eventually use to return fire, just before entering the farm. (confirming the presence of the Enemy near the western door…, in readiness for the second breech of the North Gate)
Defences :
Now, as Bob Burnham can confirm, the Allies didn’t build any defences in the wood, despite ‘turning their thumbs’ for the past 24 hours. (I’d love to lose focus here and suggest why…, however, details of that gambit will be in my book) However, to contradict the Guards Officer who described the non-defence of the wood being due to a lack of entrenching tools; it must be noted that the French Horse Artillery never made it up to the northern perimeter of the wood. Had they done so; the farm wouldn’t have lasted for more than an hour. As such and especially with two ‘navigable’ lanes, the lanes must obviously have been blocked by fallen trees.
Because of this ‘non-defensive situation,’ the 10h00 French advance into the wood must have been a relatively ‘easy’ affair. (especially with the Allies being outnumbered) This means that the time needed to push the Allies back from their leafy-loopholes to the great orchard, couldn’t have lasted longer than 45 minutes. (so; our pocket watches now indicate 10h45 to 11h00)
Lol…, Napoleon’s centre artillery gunners are still turning their thumbs; despite having just lost a General.
Note: Jérôme didn’t use any artillery on the farm during the morning.
The attack :
With the Enemy now by the wood’s northern perimeter, the sharpshooters from the gardener’s house, chateau, its tower and the loopholed wall open fire.
Note: Only those manning the wall to the west, near the southern gate can see the wood. This is due to southern lane’s long hedgerow which extends to the crossroads, obscuring any view of the of the wood for the remainder of the troops along the wall.
Macdonnell, from the NW corner, (next to Gooch) signals the charge !
At this point, I’m not quite sure if both platoons cross the garden to jump the wooden fence before moving up the lane…, however, I’d be inclined to say yes; simply because Clay describes the lane when following Standen.
Anyway, Dashwood and Wyndham advance and in doing so, the firing stops from the gardener’s house. (for obvious reasons) As they approach while firing and reloading on the move, Dashwood heads towards the western side of the wood…, Wyndham to the east.
On entering, each platoon divides in two. The two attack sections form up ‘in chain’ with each support section grouped behind them. Macdonnell then trots up and probably stops by the crossroads. Since both platoons are now well into the wood, he knows that this is a relatively safe position to supervise the attack. Note; he has no bugler ! To his left, he has the southern lane and to his extreme right he has the haystack…, while to his front, he has a forked road with the two lanes moving south. The one on the left leads towards La Belle Alliance at Plancenoit, while the other crosses the southern orchard before moving towards Genappe. As such, both lanes divide the wood in three.
From here, Macdonnell then signals to Standon. Standon then orders Drummer Brodie to sound the advance. Gooch hears the call and orders his platoon to follow Standen up the lane.
Note: John Franklin is wrong at this point when he tells us that Gooch remained by the corner. The main reason for that theory is pure military logic. No platoon can consider itself in support, if it can’t see or communicate with its CO. Note; Gooch didn’t have a bugler because the CG only had one, and he, Drummer Hinchley would have been alongside Col. Wyndham.
In fact, when you stand by that NW corner of the farm, the trunks of the trees in the wood would have been out of sight, principally due to the uphill slope having a horizon. Beyond its horizon and with another 50 yards to go in order to get to the wood, means that if Gooch remained by the NW corner, he’d be totally isolated. (I have more proof that he advanced; but that will be explained in my book) Lol…, as John often says !
As such, Standen (SG) lines his support platoon along the pastureland behind Dashwood, while Gooch (CG) lines the southern lane behind Wyndham.
Note: Neither Standon nor Gooch will ever enter the wood !
At this point, I’m not going into detail as to how Lt. Col. Macdonnell got to know about the breach of the North Gate, suffice it to say that when he found out about the infraction, he probably urinated his britches. His orders from Wellington only a couple of hours beforehand, was that the farm should never fall.
Note: The bugle sheet music for the Allies in the farm is not the same as the Guards. So, Büsgen’s bugler serves no purpose in such a situation.
Now, what he does at this moment is of vital importance. He has two choices ! One, save the farm; or two, maintain his support for the two front-line attack sections, who are now in hand-to-hand combat.
Unfortunately, Macdonnell decides to save the farm (and his rank) and in doing so, he ‘abandons ship.’ In addition and to make matters worse, he also orders Standon and Gooch to follow him…, leaving the two support sections and their COs without reinforcements: (had I been one of the two Colonels ‘in the Mess’ that night…, I’d have given him a right bollocking. Especially taking into consideration that not only were ‘we’ both seriously wounded because of his action, but our dead Guardsmen outnumbered the dead French in the farm.)
Anyway, with the advanced platoons being totally unaware about the situation and heavily outnumbered, they bugle-back for reinforcements. But there’s no response !
The COs, the Officers and the Drummers are now obliged to draw their swords.
Now, in order to give Macdonnell the benefit of the doubt, he obviously thought that he’d be unable to do anything on his own…, especially as he was unaware if the breech was section-strength, or the whole of the French Army. As such, he orders Standen and Gooch to follow him.
However, this, is his MOD Achilles Heel ! He abandoned ship; he left the two attack platoons stranded; and with no bugle sheet music (according to Kneller Hall) to signal a change in command or ‘Enemy to the Rear,’ he relies on Brodie to update the two COs. (explanation later) Then, while in the safety of the farm and in a senior-officer tantrum because he was short of men for its defence; he had the audacity to Courts-martial the attack sections who were obliged to return to their Battalions.
Concerning the retreat and unless we create a Monty Python situation, (“hold on Froggies, don’t shoot until we’re out of sight”) then these men can’t just ground-arms and run…, otherwise, they’ll all be shot in the back. So, from experience, their NCOs know they are obliged to continue firing and reloading while walking backwards. However, this take time ! Something our Heroes don’t have and Macdonnell knew fool well about such a situation !
Brodie:
As the support platoons retreat, the attack platoons are totally unaware about the situation and more especially the change in command. As such and before leaving, Standen obviously tells Drummer Brodie to sound ‘Call in the Skirmishers.’ However, we have a southerly wind, plus the cries of pain, bugles, whistles, the rattle of musket fire, smoke, confusion, bawling NCOs and the treetops rustling…, means it would have been impossible for Brodie’s bugle to be heard.
Note: I suppose one must be a Drummer, Piper or Musician to understand that when blowing into the wind, the sound is carried backwards. (being the reason why a rear Company of a Battalion on the march can sometimes find themselves out of step) Brodie and Standen knew this, so, there’s every possibility that Brodie was ordered forward as a runner, to inform the two COs verbally, concerning the change in command. More time wasted ! Again, not their fault !
What’s more, Drummer Hinchley (CG) has just been wounded, so there’s every possibility that he’d be unable to bugle-in his attack section comrades. Again, not, their fault !
If this was the case, then Brodie must find the COs ! As both COs are now seriously wounded…, are they on their backs in the ferns ? If so, how much time will it need to find them and have them change the command to Captain Erlington…, and even more time lost to inform the advanced attack sections that they should start retreating. Again…, not their fault !
By now, Macdonnell is probably forcing his log under the lock of the North Gate.
In the meantime, the two support sections manage to make it back in time, simply because our Heroes are keeping up the firepower. While all this is going on, the French are gathering force on the NW corner of the wood and are now slowly encircling the remaining Guards.
Finally, the French filter into the kitchen garden probably using the haystack smoke to advance to the western door. (this is just prior to the second breech of the North Gate)
As the French gather and regroup, they receive the last few rounds from Clay and Gann as they fire from behind the clover stack. Both men then enter the farm and Clay tells us he saw Macdonnell carrying the log.
Due to the French build-up in the garden, this cuts the main line of retreat for the remainder of the Guards. Meaning that our Heroes must run the gauntlet along the southern lane, (moving east) past the enemy in the paddock and the orchard, before turning left to climb the ridge.
Fraser:
Independent of the Courts-martial: (just an additional point of interest)
When both support platoons are ordered to retreat, Cubières, like Ney on the main battlefield, becomes too enthusiastic and moves forward while encouraging his troops to advance. Unfortunately for him, as he approaches the western door, he encounters Fraser with his halberd. Then, doing what he had been trained to do, Fraser stabs the horse…, Cubières then falls to the ground. Fraser prepares to thrust; however, his Officers intervene to ‘cool him down’ and persuade him to spare the Colonel’s life.
A few years later, Cubières will thank the Guards for their compassion. A painting of the incident can be found in the SG Officer’s Mess at Aldershot. (soon to move back to Catterick)
An email from the Regimental Adjutant SG-RHQ:
“Dear Mr Wood,
Having consulted with both the President of our Regimental Historical Committee and with the Regimental Lieutenant Colonel, Brigadier Harry Nickerson, (the Duke of Kent’s office at St James’s) I am pleased to report that they are content for you to use Sergeant Fraser’s picture in your book.
Yours sincerely…, James Kelly
Major J R Kelly
Regimental Adjutant Scots Guards”
MOD:
Despite Major Kelly telling me that I was probably “flogging a dead horse,” I have a meeting with an MoD Lawyer and the above information (and more) will be presented in order to ask for advice. The outcome of that visit will be explained here, and in my book.
In the meantime, I love criticism ! If anyone believes there’s an error in the above, I’d appreciate your remarks before I go to print.
And more especially, if anyone can assist with info concerning such a medal-recovery venture, I’d also like to hear from you.
Thank you for your patience.
Kind ReGuards…, Iain.
https://www.dropbox.com/sc/o7dyzzs5ih8niq4/AAC6g4k932bIoFowIJ1RLTwFa
Hi All…
Lol…, time’s up ! That makes three days including much of the weekend, so if anyone had any details to provide, then I suppose someone would have mentioned something.
Funny nonetheless ! I know absolutely nothing about the French and much less about their artillery, however, those interested in Jérôme must have details about their firing positions.
So be it ! Here’s my follow-up question: (theory)
As a Theorist, I will propose a likely firing point; based on the fact that the southern buildings were spared, with the haystack and the barn fires being, without doubt, accidents.
Firstly: Something I neglected to mention in my intro, was the ‘fact’ that the northern pasture of the farm was undoubtedly under water. This flood spread well into the rye field and almost certainly covered the northern tip of the western kitchen garden. (see above image of a modern-day flood) This is why Jérôme did a right flanking attack on the farm, while knowing he’d be placing his whole attacking force in full view of over half the Allied artillery on the ridge. Had he done a left flank attack, (had there been no water) Napoleon would probably have won the battle…, taking into consideration that with the mature hedgerow to the west (“with trunks as thick as your arm”) plus the poplar trees lining the northern-bound sunken lane and the Chemin du Goumont, his troops would have been out of sight from the ridge.
Now, if we agree that the pasture was flooded, then we must also agree that the infantry and cavalry would have steered well clear of the NW side of the farm.
In addition, Hougoumont was built on a low plateau surrounded by a series of dales. In an anticlockwise direction, the first is to the north of the North Gate…, containing at least three ponds, according to Craan. The second is on the NW southern side of the Nivelles road. (I’ll get back to that one later) The third/fourth is the one that the French used to protect themselves from the large shot being fired from the ridge; and the ‘sixth’ is the region of the sunken lane, below the ridge. (more of a gully; the reason why the semi-metalled surface had a stream, draining the waters from the ridge)
Anyway…, a bit like the ridge hiding Wellingtons’ troops, so did the second dale with the Nivelles road as a summit. Meaning that any French Horse Artillery venturing too far west, (into a no-mans-land) they wouldn’t have known what was on the other side of the road. (especially with Braine L’Alleud being garrisoned and the road ‘open’ to Allied horse artillery. As such, it seems logical that the French Horse Artillery would have kept to the east, in order to follow the five companies of 1st Léger skirmishers into the wood…, while using, if need be, the southern hedgerow to target the ridge.
Lol…, that’s a cosy, logical, non-expert view of Jerome’s situation. In the meantime, the follow-up is history.
Now…, we know for a fact that a howitzer was moved into the northern end of the northern paddock. (two paddocks) As such, it could only have arrived there using horses, meaning that the Horse Artillery is in the wood.
At this point, we know for a fact that they didn’t reach the northern perimeter of the wood, so, what blocked them ? Despite (apparently) ‘no’ information in any archive, it seems blatantly obvious that the Allied Pioneers had a heyday cutting down trees. But, not in any disorderly fashion ! Taking into consideration that the wood was obviously medieval, it was surely easy to navigate. (wild boar hunting etc.) As such, it would not be enough to simply cut down a few trees to cover both lanes, so, the trees would have been downed in a continuous straight line from east to the west, with the southern orchard included; in order not to have the artillery simply steer around the blockage.
Lol…, please bear with me as I’m nearly there !
Let’s now visualize the scene on the lanes to the south. To get to the barricade, they have a leafy canopy blocking out much of the sunlight…, then, suddenly, while grinding to a halt, there’s a clear sky. However, on the other side of the barricade, the leafy roof continues north. Now…, what would you do if you were the Officer in charge ? Surely not light a fire and boil up a pot of tea ! Obviously not !
Meaning that any sensible gunner would unhook the horses, train the barrels north towards the smoke billowing from the great barn, tilt the barrels to a 45° trajectory then let loose. Because of the trees to the front, he can’t lower his trajectory, so, because of the short distance (about 150 yards) the rounds can only hit the chateau and the outhouses to the north; leaving the gardener’s house intact.
Logic ?
I know I’m not making friends with post as I’m contradicting nearly every book written since 1815. However, any opposing points of view against that theory would be very welcome; before I go to print and make a fool of myself. (lol)
Kind ReGuards…, Iain.
Hi All…
I suppose Zack would have preferred a separate post for the following, however, as my two follow-up questions are related, I decided to keep them together.
In fact, with the first, (up to this point) my ‘unasked’ question was, in reality, would I have any problems with my Courts-martial objectives concerning the overruling of the court’s 1815 decision. In the meantime, and as nobody questioned it or made a remark like my Regimental Adjutant saying to me last year that I’ll be “flogging a dead horse,” I take it there’s at least a tunnel-twinkle of hope when dealing with the MoD.
As such, please consider 'part-one' closed; like that, I’ll not lose focus.
Part two questions will be two stages. The second being a follow-up to a reply. (if any)
Lol…, I know I’m mucking about with dusty 200 year-old traditional stories…, however, I believe Hougoumont needs a ‘new look.’ As such, there is the possibility that nobody will reply ! (or be able to reply)
At this point and being a bit of a newbie here, I don’t know the expertise of individual members. As such, I’m clinging on to the hope that members like Senarmont198 or DaveH and others who were on the original NFW, are present here.
This question concerns the French Horse Artillery and the bombardment of the Hougoumont farm.
My research is to try to understand why the buildings to the south of the farm were ‘untouched.’ (excluding the PM howitzer in the northern paddock that holed the front of the gardener’s house and damaged the gate)
Taking into consideration that the southern haystack fire and the fire in the great barn were accidents; (Wellington tells us so - see page one) and that the chapel and gardener’s house were untouched, probably ‘because of the NW corner of the wood;’ leads me to believe that the RHA didn’t move very far north-west (towards the Nivelles road) before firing. With the southern buildings being protected due to their acute angle of fire.
Of course, they knew a farm was there because they could see the great barn’s grey-tiled roofs, however, they would have been amazed to see the barn on fire before firing a single shot.
Because of it, could it be that the gunners thought that the 1st Léger had already done the work for them, meaning that a few rounds at the smoke would keep them from turning their thumbs ? After all, why move further west when you’re not exactly clear about what could be waiting for you on the other side of the Nivelles road ? (like the ridge - taking into consideration that Braine L’Alleud was garrisoned) Meaning that there is every possibility that they kept as close to Jérôme as possible.
So, I suppose the distance is irrelevant because that’s simply a question of trajectory…, but from WHERE would they have fired ?
That’s what I’d like to know !
Thanks in advance…, Iain.
Lol…, like old times !
The first haystack on the ‘killing zone’ was Clay, Gann and many others.
The second was what Clay called a clover stack. (probably kitchen garden rubbish etc) That’s where he and Gann fired their last outdoor shots…, meaning that the 1st Léger were probably near the western door. Also… Clay tells us that from the ‘clover stack,’ he could see the North Gate. As such, he’s telling us where the northern part of the garden ended. (Well into the water: See recent flood video image: And today's water evacuation is better than it was in 1815, meaning that in those days it was surely more extensive)
As for Toulouse…, that’s absolutely John. (and Andrew Field seems to agree)
During my research for the French Drummer Boy, John mentioned that he had already scoured France for the drummer's 1st Léger details without success. And that does seem to tally with mine is as much as the youngest drummer was 21 years old, if I remember rightly. In addition, their skirmishers wouldn’t have had drummers.
…, Iain.
Hi Mark…, hope you are well. Lol…, I suppose you’ll be making friends with Harry and Megan soon !
Lol…, you’ve already questioned me several times before concerning the two haystacks !
Thanks to this post, I had to change my manuscript three times. Once following Rod’s correction in relation to the tactics used in the wood, and the second being my own discovery in relation to southern haystack fire. Firstly, as I mentioned, the haystack was obviously on the side near the kitchen garden…, otherwise, Clay and Gann would be shooting at their own platoon. (common sense) As for the fire, it was on fire before the French Horse Artillery bombarded the northern courtyard. (according to Wellington)
As for the four breaches…, there were at least two on the North Gate. (only two that we know about) The first was when the Guards were in the wood with Macdonnell knowing absolutely nothing about it. Then peeing his britches when a runner tells him about the French in the courtyard. (lol…, ‘britches’ not breeches; another correction from Rod)
Then a second breach following Macdonnell placing the log under the lock.
Lol…, three confusing words !
Miserable weather here at Plancenoit.
Kind ReGuards…, Iain.
all a tiny bit confusing...as the first few hours were.....you placed the fire and the south wind portion near the beginning of your story - what time do you expect this to have happened? three incursions i can go along with, north gate, south gate and barn door (west), now you mention four? 10 am when movement started and skirmishing starting with 11.15-30 first artillery, from Allied side....2nd Light got in as well as the 1st, source? Did they rush down the west side once realising that they were about to be cut off, to find the gate closed?
Iain, excellent read...i'll get back to you with comment
Hi David… Please forgive this late answer, I’m still trying to get my head around the site. (just noticed that there’s a warning at the top for replies)
Concerning Büsgen, it certainly wasn’t the Allies who informed Macdonnell. However, to explain that, it’s a totally different event and would need quite some time to explain.
However, talking about Büsgen, I believe that he’s not totally without blame for the first breech…, and for reasons that are not evident at first glance.
Remember Gooch by the NW corner and his men along the northern wall ? Well, that wall only measures 12 paces between the gate and the corner. Now, his platoon strength was about 60 men, meaning that only 10 of them would have been outside. As such, that means the remaining 50 stayed inside. The fact that they stayed inside is confirmed by Büsgen.
Because you are acquainted with Büsgen’s quotes, you may remember him saying that when deploying his men throughout the farm, on looking through one of the two doors in the central wall that divides the two courtyards, he says the Coldstreamers are “still in command of the northern courtyard.” (or words to that effect)
Now, there were already Nassau-Usingen in the great barn and elsewhere to the north, so, his comment meant that he probably didn’t reinforce the northern courtyard.
Then, Macdonnell orders Standen to advance, as I mentioned above, Gooch follows him…, emptying the farm.
Now that the Guards have disappeared, this is when the Nassau would have closed the gates.
As such, it certainly looks as if the northern courtyard was undermanned.
Could be wrong of course…, Iain.
Thank you Rod…
Lol…, with all that documentation and precision, it’s not surprising you shared the same office with the Officer below. (Johnny Clavering…, he was one of my Officers)
Of course, nobody can contradict your sources, however, tactics must change when we move down to Light Company level. Such as skirmishing like the one in question, where it seems illogical to exchange a complete platoon when there’s just a dozen or so men killed or wounded. Anyway, I re-read all your 2019 emails (very kind of you) so I’ve since advanced my ‘support section.’
In doing so, nothing much changes for those in the wood because we know for a fact that both support platoons never entered the wood. However, the advantage for Macdonnell is that he has two platoons up to strength. (no dead, no wounded and most with full cartridge pouches…, except for Clay and a few others by the haystack who are firing west)
Now, with two complete platoons active in the wood, their advance would have been more powerful, meaning that Standen’s report to Siborne is now confirmed when he tells us that the Guards were well into the wood.
If so…, then so are the Officers ! And we then find ourselves back to square one with them having no support and no bugle communications. So…, Drummer Brodie must obviously enter the wood to inform the COs about the change in command.
Independent of the above, we also have Cubières confirming the remarks of his own troops when they said in Paris that he and the 1st Léger were in the kitchen garden when he was downed. Meaning here that even the French are confirming that the line of retreat for the Guards had been cut off.
In addition, we also have the Light Company Officers in both Regiments on the side of the punished. To such an extent that a few years following the battle, one of the two men who received 300 lashes and had decided to remain in the regiment, had an Officer take up his case and with Capt. Delmé Seymour Davis (later Adjutant SG Wellington Barracks) and together, they managed to have his privileges reinstated.
In the meantime, I'd like to mention that I’m also being economical with the facts as John has asked me to keep some of them to myself, until his book is published. However, they will be presented to the MoD.
…, Iain.
PS The horse doesn't look ill ! However, the Queen noticed it !
Iain,
I see it as merely the same principle of a passage of lines, but conducted at platoon as opposed to battalion level. Much of the British Regulations work like that, with the same drills being applied at different levels. Part IV Para 1 on Page 282, talking of a line of several battalions, makes the point that movements of a multi-battalion line are derived from the same general principles as those of a single battalion. That principle is repeated in Para 6 on Page 287. Page 272 makes the same point “the detail of execution will remain invariable, being compounded of those prescribed for the Company, Battalion, and the Line.”
Page 357 of my (free) electronic copy of the 1792 Regulations says:
”when a first line, which has suffered in action, retires through, and makes place for a second line which has come forward to support it, or the second line remains posted, when the first falls back, and retires through it, and thus alternately, till a safe position is attained.”
Rod
Rod… Do you have archive support for this tactic ?
Wow !!! That needs reflection ! Cumbersome yes…, but in 1815, probable.
Iain,
I am not sure that the Company Commander would have sent individual men, or files, forward from the support platoon to replace casualties in the advance platoon. I understood that they might replace the entire advance platoon with the support platoon (ie they would swap roles, probably by the advance platoon falling back and forming in close order behind the original support platoon, then that original support platoon advancing and extending to become the new advance).
Everyone was used to being in a set place in each platoon and the Company Commander would not want to mix that up. The role of the supports was to provide a close order formation for the skirmishers to fall back to, not to provide individual Battle Casualty Replacements.
Rod
Rod…, thank you again.
That is how I saw it last year when we were discussing the matter…, however, as you said, the Regulations were a guide and as you know the Guards as well as I do, they were probably capable of adapting the rules as, and how they wished. It was for that reason (pure logic) that it had me looking for an ‘on the ground solution’ for something that didn’t seem to stand up. (not enough men to cover the width of the wood)
Like your explanation, I had them working in pairs but in a single line. Having fired, he’d stop during the reload. Then, his mate would advance through the gap to fire again. (like that, the two platoons would stretch the width of the wood…, and, have two reserve sections to replace the dead as and when the CO saw fit)
Using the Regulations as you have it, if the CO bugles-in ‘five’ men from the support platoon to replace five dead, then these men have to run forward to the CO, get an explanation on where the dead have fallen, run forward (now out of breath) then blend in with the system while getting to know the Enemy and the ground.
That’s long-winded, illogical and not very tactical. Had the CO a replacement with him who is not out of breath and that replacement knows the terrain just as well as the CO, the act of replacing the dead would be much more efficient.
But who am I to change the rules ?
In the meantime, what I will do is change my storyline.
Thanks again for all your help. Please count on me in adding your name to my book. I’ll let you know before hand to ask for your details.
Kind Regards…, Iain.
PS In any case…, it was sheer stupidity to have attacked the wood and I’m wondering if Macdonnell didn’t misunderstand the orders. I believe that Wellington positioned the Guards in the kitchen garden simply to block the Enemy from left flanking the farm.
It’s my belief that the Allied retreat from the wood was premeditated (‘no defences’) with the idea that when they were replaced by the French, the artillery behind the chateau would have opened fire to ‘splinter’ and shrapnel them all to death. Something they couldn’t do until later, because of the Guards !!
But that’s another story as I look over my shoulder !
Then again…
If that was the case, the three platoons wouldn’t have been lining the garden hedge. If they were there just for defence, they’d have built a barricade between the SW corner and the hedge !
That whistle is in the Guards Museum… PS Rod, just noticed your message. Will reply soon.
Hans…, thanks. It’s a pity that the whistle MP3 didn’t work. I believe its quite old and when listening, it provides an ambiance that helps one enter the imaginary world of the men in action. Perhaps if I send a copy to Zack, he may be able to upload it to YouTube. (too complicated for me)
I have never researched the Dutch or German bugle calls. Only to inquire if Büsgen could have been in any way responsible for informing Macdonnell of the breech…, with the answer to that being negative.
Getting back to the actual incident… I woke up during the night and it suddenly occurred to me that because Rod is almost certainly correct concerning the form-up of the attack platoon, my distress was that there must have been more Guardsmen killed than I originally thought. (believing that half of the advanced platoons made it back to the farm alongside their officers)
A couple of days later and in hospital, I thought Captain Evelyn was exaggerating when he talked about many losses. (archives only tell us if they died…, but not where they died.)
Unless I’m mistaken, I believe that all the officers returned to the farm…, underlining the form-up theory that both groups of officers were to the rear. (serving as a transit position for the soldiers from the support platoon to the front line)
As such, the situation for Macdonnell is worse than I thought. On ‘abandoning ship,’ he knew he was depriving the advanced forces of support; but it’s now nearly two platoons that were surrounded.
Question for the specialists: We know that officers had servants and/or batmen; would they have remained with their officers during this type of skirmish ?
(in fact, I’m trying to calculate who probably carried Dashwood and Wyndham back to the farm)
…, Iain.
the you tube video worked, I am very much impressed by the bugle boy, to remember all those signals.
Here a - alas only selection from the Prussians of 1813 - 15
Didn't work !!
Hans…, Hi !
The URLs below might interest you…, especially the first.
At 72-years old, I’m not a Geek… As such; I’ll try and add an MP3. This is a rare recording of the actual whistle calls.
No idea if it will be accepted by this website ! If not, then please let me know with an email address and I’ll send it on.
Kind Regards…, Iain.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CIn-fvoCCCU&feature=share
https://www.tapatalk.com/groups/2nd95thrifles/whistles-whistle-t127.html?sid=8986deb03a75098449f19b3f75b50e7f
Iain,
Perhaps the first thing to say is that the Regulations were a guide, not necessarily to be followed slavishly, particularly in the way they may be applied by a Foot Guards Regiment who would be well aware that they were written by a Rifle Regiment Officer.
Assuming the Regulations were followed, then the company, of approximately 100 men, would split into two platoons each of 50. The company should have one Captain and three Lieutenants (Flank companies were supposed to have all Lieutenants and no Ensigns, although sometimes they clearly actually did have Ensigns). Each platoon should therefore have two officers, 3 sergeants, 3 corporals and one drummer (who may have actually carried a bugle in Light Companies). Normally the left platoon, commanded by the senior Lieutenant, would go forward, and the Captain would be in support with the right platoon. That would allow the Captain to keep control of the whole of his company and facilitate him deciding if the advance platoon should retire or need replacing with the rear one.
The rear platoon would be in close order in two ranks, therefore a frontage of 25 men occupying some 50 feet. The advance platoon would be 50 paces ahead of this, also in two ranks but with the files extended to cover whatever frontage they needed to cover, normally up to a maximum of 6 paces. The distance between the ranks in the advance platoon is open (2 paces) and the men in the rear rank will move a pace or two (depending on the interval between files) to the side, so that they could fire past the front rank if they needed to. Normally one man in each pair holds his fire until the other has loaded. The corporals will be in the skirmish line with the men, but at intervals (flanks and section) to help keep control. The officers and sergeants will form a supernumerary rank at the rear, although there might have been a Sergeant on each flank of the skirmish line. The drummer (bugler) will stay close to the platoon commander.
Rod
Hi Rod… Just back home from visiting my daughter.
I knew before posting, that that tactical aspect would be questioned, being the reason why I mentioned you.
I’ve been researching this manoeuvre for at least 5 years and as I was getting nowhere fast, was the reason why I contacted you. However, things just don’t add up !
I had your system in place, (double file, one behind the other) but about 50 men in line with another fifty to the rear reloading would never span the width of the wood. Then, one thing led to another when I realized that a CO would never find himself shoulder-to-shoulder, up front, between a couple of privates. As such, the platoon CO was obviously to the rear. With him of course would have been his bugler, so that makes two.
Then we have the Officers ! Now, at one point (in any skirmish) the front line could find themselves in hand-to-hand combat…, and it’s certainly not the officers who would mix with the men…, so they’d be to the rear with the CO and get involved only at the very last moment.
I suppose my error was to have half the platoon remaining with the officers !
As such, would I be correct in saying that the attack platoon officers stay together, with the remainder of the platoon to the front in double file ? Two lines of 30 with the CO calling in reinforcements from the two support platoons, when need be.
Concerning the support platoons…, John, Clay and Standen to Siborne tell us that they never entered the wood. However, the only person who says that the attack platoons were DEEP in the wood was Standen. But I suppose he could have been exaggerating.
If the two attack platoons officers were still in sight, then I suppose it’s normal that Standen and Gooch would have remained static.
Lol…, does that make more sense ?
…, Iain.
PS I'm posting this too quickly ! I should have waited until tomorrow morning !