Hi I am Barry Newcombe and I am a volunteer at Apsley house, I am interested in D’Erlon’s attack on Wellingtons left at Waterloo. I read in David Hamilton-Williams book ‘Waterloo, New Perspectives’. That D’Erlon discussed with his subordinates before the battle And decided to attack ’in line’ instead of the usual French attack in blocks which spread out just before engagement, (which is described as how the Imperial Guard attacked the Centre, later in the day). It makes sense to me if they did do this as it would explain better how Uxbridge’s charge managed to break up the attack so completely. Also my colleague found at painting which shows the attack approaching and it appears to be a series of lines three or four men deep. However I am still not sure that this happened. Does anyone have any evidence of how this attack progressed?
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![](https://static.wixstatic.com/media/5419df_c6ec6ae35d74456f894d5638e0dc216e~mv2.jpg/v1/fill/w_1040,h_789,al_c,q_85,enc_auto/5419df_c6ec6ae35d74456f894d5638e0dc216e~mv2.jpg)
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The whole discussion is not helped by the use of division, meaning a grouping of companies in a battalion, and a Division, a formation consisting of brigades. I suppose it comes from dividing a battalion or dividing a Corps into er.. divisions.
Andrew, here the relavant parts for Columns & evolutions
Best regards
Good Day Andrew, Many thanks for typing the text in french !
it is interesting, because the designation used at the start of the thread (colonne de division par bataillon) is something strange. i have found it in a book published in 1898 about the 1870 war "Siege de Paris" with a ref. to General Ducrot own book using it. after that it had been used and reused by others for Waterloo.. . for me it's either colonne par division (for a small body of troops) or it's colonne par bataillon (for a great body of troops - regiment, brigade, division).
here some infos on colonne par bataillons from Bardin's dictionary ..
COLONNE PAR BATAILLONS (F). (see Bardin, page 1391)
Sorte de COLONNE ÉPAGOGIQUE qui avait, pour SUBDIVISIONS, des BATAILLONS espacés de trente à quarante pas. Le prince EUGÈNE passe pour avoir inventé, à la fin du dix-septième siècle, cette ORDONNANCE. LEBLOND (1758, B) et TRAVERSE (1758,D) en parlent comme d'une COLONNE usitée de leur temps. Depuis la GUERRE DE SEPT ANS, Les REGLEMENTS D'EXERCICE y avaient substitué la COLONNE PAR DEMI-BATAILLON ; mais les règlements les plus modernes n'admettent ni l'une ni l'autre de ces COLONNES.
— Cependant I'INFANTERIE FRANÇAISE combattait, à JEMAPPES, en Colonne par bataillon.
—BONAPARTE a fait emploi des Colonnes par bataillon ; la bataille d'AUSTERLITZ (Journal des Sciences militaires, t. XXII, p. 205) en donne plus d'un exemple.
— Il est croyable que quand il sera créé une ÉCOLE DE BRIGADE et DE DIVISION, on adoptera ce moyen d'ÉVOLUTION, la GUERRE DE LA RÉVOLUTION et la manière de former les RÉSERVES en ont prouvé l'utilité en TACTIQUE.
— Au camp de Kalish, en 1856, la formation primitive d'une DIVISION RUSSE de seize BATAILLONS s'ordonnait à raison d'un front de quatre BATAILLONS, chaque RÉGIMENT étant en Colonne par BATAILLON. Les premier et second bataillons formaient PREMIÈRE LIGNE, les troisième et quatrième BATAILLONS, à vingt pas de distance des autres, formaient SECONDE LIGNE.
the points are :
ÉCOLE DE BRIGADE et DE DIVISION (school of ..)
moyen d'ÉVOLUTION (mean of..)
What is problematic is that the sub elements from D' Erlon's great bodies of troops are not at a distance of 30-40 paces, but at 5/6 paces .. so closed in mass. And those sub elements are "en bataille" not using a sub-divisionary column type.
another point is to look at the definitions of Evolutions vs Maneuvers (see Bardin pages 2111-2117) ...
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another point is the text of Napoleon's order : the intent is to execute an attack on the village of Mt St Jean (a built up area)
if that's the case what is the best grand tactical formation for such mission ?
« Une fois que toute l’armée sera rangée en bataille, à peu près à une heure de l’après-midi, au moment où l’empereur en donnera
l’ordre au maréchal Ney, l’attaque commencera pour s’emparer du village de Mont-Saint-Jean, où est l’intersection des routes.
À cet effet, les batteries de 12 du 2e corps et celles du 6e se réuniront à celles du 1er corps. Ces vingt-quatre bouches à feu tireront sur les troupes de Mont-Saint-Jean, et le comte d’Erlon commencera l’attaque en portant en avant sa division de gauche et en la soutenant, suivant les circonstances, par les autres divisions du 1er corps.
Le 2e corps s’avancera à mesure pour garder la hauteur du comte d’Erlon. Les compagnies de sapeurs du 1er corps seront prêtes pour se barricader sur-le-champ à Mont-Saint-Jean. »
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a nice map by Jakub S. with the link to his site : there more maps showing the possible sequence by 1st Corps, and a long article.
https://www.austerlitz.org/cz/bitva-u-waterloo-marsal-ney-a-jeho-vojenske-studie/
Good Day Andrew,
A question about > "the 1st Corps Campaign Diary states, ‘…he [Napoleon] ordered Count d’Erlon to make his deployment for the attack on the enemy’s left. To form to this end each of his divisions in Colonne par Bataillon and to have them march in echelon…’"
Do you have Mr Beckett books ? can you confirm that it is exactly and strictly written as *colonne par bataillon* ? (and without a 's' at the end of bataillon ?)
there are various articles online, but i can't remember this detail about the precise type of column in Napoleon's order.
thank you for your help
I guess this thread is coming to a natural end, I’m not sure you will all see this but, thank you so much to everyone who as written on this, especially Andrew and Hans- Karl. I have learn‘t so much not just about Waterloo but History research in general. Hopefully I have not been the only one to benefit. Lastly thanks to Zack for running this web site.
Barry
@Hans - Karl Weiß I’ll let you into a secret, it already is that good. It’s just being used for more important things right now, just not for frivolous things like 200 year old battles. Almost every modern student has experienced anti-plagiarism software. It’s capable of detecting not only straight lifts (ie shared sources) but similar styles and ‘disguised’ passages. I wonder how many so-called “ as never before” works would stand such a rigorous treatment? Detectives are using AI to analyse witness statements. This allows correlations and vignettes to be identified and any influence from one to another to be understood. When overlaid with geographical information it can assist in building a timeline. This will not necessarily be definitive, but it still might rule out some of our more dearly established myths.
Joseph-Marcellin Rullière?
Dictionnaire universel des contemporains : contenant toutes les personnes notables de la France et des pays étrangers... : ouvrage rédigé et tenu à jour, avec le concours d'écrivains et de savants de tous les pays (Troisième édition entièrement refondue et considérablement augmentée) / par G. Vapereau
https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k34496h/f1570.image.r
Barry, I think the problem is that with such an unmitigated disaster, hindsight will prevent any realistic analysis of why it was used. We have near contempraneous accounts of what happened from participants, so we at least can begin to say how this formation went wrong.
Problem is, even the War Diary was written after the event, and may therefore have been sanitised or even scapegoated. I've been involved in the grubby business of writing formation war diaries on operations; you might think that might happen, I couldn't possibly comment.
More than one item from that petit dejeuner 'conference' has been shown as a fabricated myth, and heaven only knows that battle has more than it's fair share. I wouldn't put it beyond the wit of a good officer to put the blame for it on a recently abdicated emperor......
I think it a mistake to believe that everyone in the aftermath was still wearing a violet for Napoleon. Here is the opinion of an anonymous French officer, quoted just the following year:
"The enormous faults, of which he was guilty, may however rather be imputed to his want of skill, attended by temerity without bounds, and to that well known and incorrigible madness, which prompted him on every occasion to push on with blind confidence"
Journal of the Three Days of the Battle of Waterloo by an 'Eye Witness' London 1816
First things first, you can chuck Hamilton-Williams in the bin (and shame on the publisher, who reprinted his stuff a few years ago) as he is a fantasist and has a conviction and caution for theft-related offences. Some people tell me he did do some original work on Waterloo, but as it cannot be distinguished from the fantasy, don’t place reliance on anything he wrote.
I know very little about Waterloo myself, but you might like to have a look at the discussion on Guibert, where we have got into that column at Jemappes 23 years earlier just down the road and how it was supposed to have started as the 1791 reg attack columns (which are the blocks deploying, which you refer to). Looking at the three columns if you include MacDonald’s at Wagram, it looks like French tactics are rather more clumsy battering-rams me than the skilful elan that we are told about. So, I am of the view that d’Erlon (who fought at Jemappes) was not an isolated episode. However, given the Jemappes thread, it does seem that Chartres and MacDonald did provide flank protection against cavalry, which d’Erlon didn’t.
Hi Andrew, Thank you so much for your detailed answer and yes I would love to continue the discussion by email I have a few questions which no doubt you could answer. So long as it does not take too much of your time.
Barry: The formation adopted by d’Erlon’s corps at Waterloo has long been one of the most controversial aspects of the battle. It was one that had never been used before throughout the wars of the First Empire and who ordered it, and why, long remained a mystery.
Their official designation was colonne de division par bataillon; a column made up of an entire division (averaging four to five thousand men in d’Erlon’s corps), with a battalion frontage. Each battalion deployed into a line three ranks deep, with each battalion formed one behind the other. As the average strength of a battalion in the I Corps was just over 510 men the frontage of the column was about 140 men when the light (voltigeur) company is subtracted (these were deployed as skirmishers). The depth of the column varied according to the strength of the division; in a division of eight battalions it would therefore be 24 ranks deep (eight battalions one behind the other, each in three ranks).
In fact, only two of the corps’ four divisions, those of Marcognet and Donzelot, formed up in this way. Quiot’s division, forming the left of the assault, operated in two separate brigades. Charlet’s brigade formed up in the familiar assault columns; colonne de bataillon par division, battalion columns with a two company frontage (rather confusingly, two companies operating together were also called a division), so that four such columns were formed. This brigade was given the mission of capturing the farm of La Haye Sainte. The other brigade (Bourgeois’) formed into a similar column to Marcognet and Donzelot, with a deployed battalion frontage, but with only a single brigade’s depth (twelve ranks).
In Durutte’s division Pégot’s brigade and the 95th de ligne (of Brue’s brigade) formed up in the same way as Bourgeios’ and formed the extreme right and rear echelon of d’Erlon’s attack. The other regiment of Brue’s brigade, the two battalions of the 85th de ligne, the weakest of the division’s regiments, remained in their starting position to protect an artillery battery and to provide an uncommitted reserve in case of the failure of Pégot’s attack. The 85th were formed into square.
As I have said, for many years there has been much debate as to who ordered the unusual formation used by d’Erlon’s corps. However, thanks to Stephen Beckett’s excellent work locating long lost French communication records and reports from the campaign, we now know the answer: the 1st Corps Campaign Diary states, ‘…he [Napoleon] ordered Count d’Erlon to make his deployment for the attack on the enemy’s left. To form to this end each of his divisions in Colonne par Bataillon and to have them march in echelon…’
This therefore confirms that it was Napoleon himself who ordered these much-criticised columns
The next question that we must ask ourselves is why such a formation was used if it was clumsy to control and manoeuvre, vulnerable to both musket and artillery fire, and to a charge of cavalry. This is the fundamental issue, but strangely one that is avoided by any commentator or historian I can find. The tragic consequences of the formation are well known and so, with the benefit of hindsight, it is universally condemned.
In the Peninsular War, the French habitually employed battalion attack columns. These columns had many advantages; with their narrow frontage they could move quickly about the battlefield, even over difficult terrain, allowing them to get a decisive force to the critical place at the critical time. Being more compact than line they were easier to keep in order, as the officers and NCOs could more easily maintain control. The flanks of the column were also more secure than those of a line, and by closing the intervals between the companies the column quickly became a viable square against cavalry. Finally, a flank attack by infantry could also be more effectively countered, as the column was so much deeper than a two- or three-deep line.
The major weakness of the column was, of course, its lack of firepower, as only a third of its strength, at most, could use their muskets effectively, as opposed to a hundred percent of a British two-deep line. The large columns employed at Waterloo could therefore be seen as a good compromise between the two types of formation. Having the frontage of a battalion deployed in line would go some way to making the firefight far more equal in the numbers of muskets that were able to be used. The depth of the column gave it momentum and solidity, and made it imposing in order to shake the morale of the enemy.
However, it was not British firepower that broke d’Erlon’s attack, but the charge of the British heavy cavalry. However, as they were used in relatively small numbers in the Peninsula, and were little used in the major battles, can we not forgive the French commanders for putting the priority on countering the British superiority in infantry firepower rather than anticipating a significant commitment of British cavalry so early in the battle?
For those who remain sceptical, it should be noted that columns were accepted as a perfectly adequate formation to resist cavalry. After all, they were just solid squares and all that was required was for the short intervals between the battalions to close up, the files on the flanks to turn outwards and the rear ranks to turn around and the firepower and hedge of bayonets was every bit as effective as any square.
This is a bigger subject than I have space to discuss here, but I am very happy to correspond privately if you wish; Zack has my private email address which I am happy for him to forward to you.
Hi Barry, yes that's all working fine now. Thanks for taking the time to do it! Hope you are keeping well.
Hi Barry, I'll let @Andrew Field cover the exact details - he knows it better than I do. Can I ask a quick favour as forum moderator - can you go into the members area (click the tab at the top of the page) and ammend your profile so that it states your full name? Just makes life easier in terms of knowing who is posting what, and is one of the forum rules for transparency. Thanks in advance, and welcome to the forum!