Waterloo - Hougoumont and ‘support platoons.’

The French at Waterloo were certainly not élite soldiers. It is calculated that up to two thirds had only served since 1813, after the re-building of the army after its destruction in Russia. However, this does not suggest that they were mostly inexperienced recruits; many of the man had fought in 1813 and 1814 and therefore had both campaign and battlefield experience. The armée du Nord still contained a very large number of very experienced officers and NCOs. It’s key problem was there was little unit cohesion; many of the regiments, including in the Imperial Guard, had been recently put together with soldiers from a wide variety of previous regiments and other sources (such as recent volunteers), and officers had had little time to train and get to know their men. Don’t forget that the army fought well at both Ligny and Quatre Bras.

In the French army, half companies were more of a drill element (for changing formations) rather than a tactical element (as Hans-Karl states).

Putting aside Zulus (“fousands of ‘em”), French tactics for attacking and defending broken/difficult terrain (such as woods and built-up areas) were similar to those of many other nations. Although it difficult to find such tactics written down, the Waterloo campaign has several good examples at Ligny and Waterloo, indeed, the tactics to attack or defend a wood or built-up area (let’s call this ‘broken terrain’ insomuch as it denied participants using close order formations) were very similar.

When attacking broken terrain, the attack would initially be made by trained light infantry (by which I include light companies of ‘line’ units) operating as skirmishers. If these were successful in driving out the defenders, they would then be reinforced from their battalions to then defend what had been taken. While this initial fight was taking place, the main body/ies of their units would remain in column a tactical bound behind the broken terrain. The distance of this tactical bound would be dictated by the ground, ideally finding ground that gave the waiting column/s some cover and may even be pushed right up to the edge of the wood or built-up area to take advantage of the cover provided there. In more open ground, it may stay back out of effective artillery range. If the light companies were unable to dislodge the defenders, then further companies would be deployed forward to reinforce them. Although these might be ‘centre’ or ‘fusilier’ companies, this does not mean they could not operate in loose formation; it is obvious that in much broken terrain troops could not move in closed formations. If the skirmishers were pushed back by the defenders, they could rally behind the formed columns.

When defending broken terrain, the actual ground was defended by troops also operating in skirmish order; small groups of determined men. The rest of their unit/s were formed up behind the broken terrain, preferably in some sort of cover from artillery fire, from where they could send reinforcements forward as required. In the case that the skirmish troops were thrown out of the wood or buildings, they could rally behind the support troops who would launch a more formal counter attack into the broken ground while the enemy were still disordered and short of ammunition.

Lieutenant Ellison of the 1st Foot Guards describes these support columns at Hougoumont, ‘I was sent at one time of the day (I believe about 2:00 o'clock) from the orchard with some light troops to drive the French skirmishers back, who had become very annoying to the farm, and were gradually gaining ground, particularly on the right flank of our position. We drove them quite out of the wood upon three French columns, which were posted at the bottom of the hill outside the wood…’ They are also described by Nassau troops in the fight for Papelotte/Smohain.

The fighting for the villages of Ligny and St Amand at the battle of Ligny are good examples of these tactics and are well documented.

It was not unusual for units to use ‘centre’ companies for skirmishing; there are many examples of this at Waterloo, including by Major Lebeau, commander of the 1st Line Regiment who wrote (after launching his two first battalions in abortive attacks against Hougoumont), ‘Breaking down as skirmishers the remains of these two battalions onto the two flanks of this farm… I marched on it with the third battalion, my last resource…’ It is also worth reading General Pelet’s description of the fighting in Planchenoit.

In summary, there is no description of columns in the Hougoumont wood. It is possible that some took cover in there whilst waiting to send troops forward, but certainly no attacks are likely to have been launched against the wall or buildings in column: how could they have moved through the trees in any kind of order, or certainly, through the thick hedges which are clearly described between the wood and the walls. The only columns described by eyewitnesses were outside the wood and would have fed troops forward as required as already described.

Many histories describe attack after attack being launched, eventually by the whole of Reille’s 2nd Corps against Hougoumont. Apart from the fact that only three brigades were involved in attacking Hougoumont, Reille states that after Girard’s division had been taken from him to fight at Ligny (and remained there after the battle), and having been most heavily involved in the fighting at Quatre Bras, his corps numbered only 12,000 infantry at Waterloo. Are we seriously meant to believe that 12,000 men were deployed in a wood that was little more than about 200 metres square?!

It is more reasonable (a combination of common sense and military probability) to suspect that as a brigade’s companies were spent after being fed into the fighting (a combination of exhaustion, casualties and lack of ammunition), they rallied back on the supporting columns. That is, given what we have described as the tactics used in such fighting, the whole brigade would not have been deployed in its entirety in the wood. French accounts describe using the cover provided by a sunken lane (that ran to la Belle Alliance from the direction of Braine l’Alleud) and other columns that were closed up on the wood to take advantage of the cover from sight provided by the trees.

We should also consider how units were deployed. Each French brigade consisted of two regiments. Two of Jérôme’s regiments had three battalions (the 1st and 2nd Line of Soye’s brigade), while of Bauduin’s brigade, the 1st Light had four and 3rd Line had only two. As the brigades started the battle one in front of the other, when committed as a brigade, the two regiments would most likely have advanced side by side, a frontage of six battalions in column. Even if a brigade reserve was maintained of one battalion from each regiment, this still leaves a frontage of four battalions. This suggests that a brigade frontage exceeded the width of the wood. So if we take Bauduin’s brigade, if the 1st Light concentrated on clearing the wood (a sensible use of a light unit), it is quite possible that the 3rd Line did not enter the wood at all but attacked the kitchen garden and the western side of the buildings. For me, this makes it far more likely that the break-in through the northern gate was conducted by the 3rd Line and not the 1st Light, and this is supported by the much heavier casualties in the 3rd Line.

More to follow...

I have been very slow in coming into this thread as I have been working hard on another research project and missed it when it was running. However, having recently done much research on the fight for Hougoumont, I felt I should add my ha’pence worth to broaden members’ knowledge on this topic.

But first, I should declare an interest: I have been corresponding with Iain for some years now, trying to help him put his story together, especially from the French perspective. We have not always agreed(!) and on many topics have agreed to disagree. What follows is my interpretation, and where it differs from what Iain has to say, it should not be seen as criticism, just a difference in interpretation. Iain, as he clearly states, has a particular audience in mind; he is not writing a detailed history based exclusively on detailed research. And it is this that has motivated me to finally get involved, so that members can understand what is Iain’s interpretation and what is historically more accurate, as best as we can manage, based on detailed research.

What follows is my interpretation and I would be delighted to be challenged by anyone who would like to share further evidence with me/us that I may not have access to.

As this will be a long piece, I plan to break it down into a number of posts.

I will start with Iain’s many reference’s to a French howitzer which takes quite a central part in his story. In the many eyewitness accounts of the fighting at Hougoumont, there is only a single mention of an artillery piece. This is from Captain and Lieutenant Colonel Lord Saltoun, of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Foot Guards, who commanded the two light companies of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of that regiment that made up the 1st Brigade of the 1st (Guards) Division commanded by General Cooke. Saltoun describes the piece as a ‘gun’, not a ‘howitzer’, and if you wanted to knock down a wall from close range, a gun rather than a howitzer, given that a howitzer had a minimum range of about 350 yards, is certainly what you would choose. In no dependable account, and certainly no dependable eyewitness account, is it described as a howitzer.

Stating how many rounds a howitzer fired and the effect they have is pure speculation. Basing the latter on the evidence of paintings, one of which depicts a vignette which no eyewitness describes, is not evidence. As the painting has been plucked from the artist’s imagination, the direction of fire of the ‘howitzer’ is hardly proven by this! We do not know how many rounds an artillery piece may have fired; it may not even have fired once! Bringing one close enough to fire directly at the walls/buildings did not bode well for crew survivability, it would certainly have attracted a lot of fire, and the fact it hardly gets mentioned suggests it did not stay in action for long.

From where the ‘howitzer’ is described as being positioned, in the southeast corner of the orchard, the gun commander would absolutely not have been able to see the southern gate, let alone fire at it.

Saltoun’s statement that ‘he’ tried to capture the gun is officer speak for he ordered someone to do it: the idea of him rushing forwards alone in the front of countless enemies is ludicrous. What would he have been able to do on his own if he had actually reached it?! No one else mentions the attempt to disable this gun.

Later in the battle, Napoleon ordered a battery of howitzers to be formed [Litre, E, Les Régiments d’Artillerie à Pied de la Garde, le Régiment Monté de la Garde et la 23e Régiment d’Artillerie, Notice Historique, (Paris: Plon. 1895), p.435.] to bombard Hougoumont and it was almost certainly this, firing from the high ground to the south/southwest that caused much of the damage to Hougoumont and was probably responsible for setting fire to the chateau etc., though don’t forget that Reille’s corps had four divisional batteries (three of the infantry divisions and one of the cavalry division) each with two howitzers, which could certainly have done this on their own. And that does not include the two horse batteries of Kellerman’s corps that were also ordered to support Reille.

More to follow...

A thank you to all those who replied.

Using your info, I have combined the remarks with my research, while using period artists for intelligence gathering. As a result, and while waiting for some potential Agent to reply concerning my manuscript, I’ve used the last few days to put together the following mise-en-scene.

This concerns the unsuccessful attempted Southgate breach. Its timing must have been about 12h00. (two hours into the battle)

By this time, the French had since cleared the wood, and upon their arrival at the northern perimeter, they immediately came under fire from the sharpshooters and the Guards in the building, plus the western wall. (not the southern wall, as it was out of sight due to the southern lane’s hedgerow) This means that for the French, the only way to ‘advance,’ was to move east, using the long blind-spot along the lane. Remember that at the far end of this lane, it opened out onto the main battlefield. On moving east, they quickly encounter the great orchard’s barricaded gate on the left, and would have come under immediate fire from the Coldstream manning the garden’s SE corner wall. This obliges them to move further east towards the SE corner of the orchard.

In the meantime, prior to the battle, I have a hunch that that corner hedge had a narrow opening. That said, simply because it was not an area susceptible to scrumping. Any thief wishing to steal apples would have done so using the sunken lane, 200-yards away to the north. However, the farmhands, if they had anything to do with the rye field, they would have been reluctant to circle the whole farm to enter the Northgate, where they had their living quarters in the northern outhouses. This tells us they would have created a ‘sneaky’ narrow passage in the hedge, to provide them with a diagonal shortcut through the great orchard.

If this was the case, then as soon the French arrived at the corner, they’d find the hole. If this was not the case, then they would have hacked away the branches to create an opening. According to Lord Saltoun, this hole became the enemy’s main entry-point for the remainder of the afternoon.

Prior to this tactical manoeuvre and following the first beach of the Northgate, Saltoun had been ordered back to the great orchard. (this was about an hour ago) Meaning that he and his two Grenadier Guards Light Companies had absolutely nothing to do, simply because there was no enemy in the orchard. So far, all the fighting had been in the wood. Firstly with the allies, then, at about 11h00, it was the turn of the Guards. The latter having been obliged to participate due to all the tactical blunders made by Lt. Col. James Macdonell. (between the words ‘by and Lt.,’ I deleted the words “that idiot”) Following his ill-fated attack, dozens were killed, and many were either wounded or taken prisoner. As a result, he, like his Mess-Mate Lt. Col. Wyndham, both developed PTSD.

As this Southgate was to become the fourth breach of the day, there were more than enough reinforcements in the farm to cope with the event. At this point, it must be remembered that companies were being fed-in right from the start, and by 14h30, the whole battalion of Scots Guards was in place, (acording to the letter to Sir Walter Scott) …, plus eight companies of Coldstream and the Allies. (and even at 14h30, many of them had nothing to do)

Let’s now move back to the embarrassed Cubières in the wood as he watched the canister smoke-trails drifting over the southern lane’s hedge. (Cubières is still alive and kicking, despite being horseless) Like Wellington with Major Bull of the Royal Artillery, Cubières would have wanted this artillery unit to preoccupy themselves with the sharpshooters in the southern buildings. In the meantime, with the howitzer having been firing incendiary canisters from the southern paddock, the gun commander ‘would not have known’ about the gardener’s house. This tells us that those using the hole in the hedge, could have informed the gun commander that the position held a clear view of the Southgate. Note…, willy-nilly blind-shots were out of the question as that was considered a waste of ammunition. The gun commander was obliged to see each explosion in order to recalibrate the trajectory and the gun’s arc-of-fire. As such, this hole in the hedge would have been enlarged. (how they did it is another story) Following this new position, the howitzer then changed munitions to explosive large-shot. Distance…, about 350-paces, which necessitated the use of the shortest wood-fuse possible. Any closer, and the rounds would have over-shot the buildings. (according to Stephan Sommerville)

By this time of course, because Lord Saltoun had so many reinforcements, this tells us that the gun wouldn’t have had more than a 15-minute volley, before being forcibly extracted. Saltoun tried taking it out single-handed, but the French had obviously secured a perimeter.

During this volley, not a single soldier would have been present on the pastureland in front of the buildings, for obvious reasons. (today’s car park) In the meantime, one shot shattered the Southgate. (as per Matthew Clay) Another could have killed Capt. Craufurd. (as per the memorial plaque) Another skims off the western wall reducing it slightly in height. (as per the 1817 Mudford painting) And another shatters the roof of Dumonceau’s office. (as per the 1815 Dighton painting)

That last piece of info provides the proof that the gun was firing from the east, as that part of the roof would have been sheltered from any southern or western volleys. What’s more, ‘had’ that volley originated from the battlefield, and because of the height of the trees, then the artillery’s trajectory would have over-shot the buildings. In addition, ‘had’ that volley originated from the battlefield, then any expert will tell you that because of the distance, the resulting ‘beaten zone’ would have been widespread. However, during this volley, the explosions were relatively well grouped. (as they should be during a ‘bullseye’ target practice)

All that now tells us that the majority of the French troops were still in the wood, watching and cheering as these explosions ravaged the buildings, meaning that their next step was a well calculated affair, and thanks to the experience of Cubières and his officers, the follow-up would certainly not have been a ‘Zulu charge,’ as depicted in quite a few spiced-up paintings.

As such, a maximum of one platoon (about 50 men) would have been sent forward to the gate, while the Scots Guards were evacuating their wounded. I say SG because the CG were on the lower level of the formal garden, between the balustrade and the eastern wall. It must be noted here that despite the SG chaos among all those in and around the building, the allied sharpshooters were still manning the SW loopholed stables, and as they had been untouched by the howitzer, they were still very active. (judging from Julie Bajart’s technical drawing of this part of the building, there must have been a minimum of ten loopholes) This meant that as soon as the French arrived at the Southgate, they would have been obliged to ‘huddle’ against the gate and the wall. (probably being the reason why the drummer lost his drum) That said, simply because the stable loopholes had a limited arc-of-fire.

Of course, Victor Hugo tells us that it was the 1st Léger that climbed the western wall. (Bob’s ‘6 against 200’) Independent of Hugo’s false-news reports, if he was correct concerning the regiment, then that tells us two platoons were involved. Bravo Hugo…, as that seems like a logical number, not just because of the dynamic Cubières being impatient for another attack, but it would also confirm the fact that the 1st Léger held the eastern half of the wood. (first into the wood, and first out, along the southern lane. And because they were first in, then this explains why the 1st Léger made up the major part of all the prisoners destined for Dartmoor…, according to Paul Lindsey Dawson) As for Sarrand’s follow-up battalion having entered the domain via the southern orchard, he would have held the western half of the wood, and like the Guards to the north, that info tells us that the wood was overcrowded, with five light companies to the east, and a battalion to the west. Unfortunately for Sarrand, he was severely wounded with two small-shots to the hip and the leg…, and had had been keeping his head down in the rye field until the next morning.

As the 1st Léger skirmishers did not have drummers, for obvious reasons, (lol…, as a former Guardsman, I can easily imagine them waddling like jack-booted Life Guards late for parade) means that Matthew Clay’s remark about a French Drummer Boy allows us to label the battalion as being the ‘2nd Bn. 2nd Régiment d'Infanterie de Ligne.’ (as advised in an email by John Franklin who verified the archives at Vincennes)

🤣 …, sorry for the giggle.

Have a nice weekend. Sun here at Plancenoit, despite the hailstones earlier on.

I have never heard the terms assault platoon or support platoon in a Napoleonic context. To understand how a battalion was organised and functioned, I wonder if it would help you if you acquired a copy of the 1791 Reglement (I'm assuming you haven't looked at it). By 1815 the French infantry battalion fought in six equal sized pelotons, so each peloton might comprise soldiers from at least two different compagnies. Each peloton comprised two sections disposed side by side. There was no half-company. The compagnie was not a tactical sub-unit but an administrative one. A battalion usually fought as a single entity and manoeuvred by pelotons. If a peloton was deployed for skirmishing it was normal for only a proportion to be deployed to the skirmish line, typically a third, or half, with the remainder as supports and reserve. But, I don’t think were dealing with skirmishing here and I have never seen any instructions or detailed description of how a battalion functioned for fighting in built up areas, which is not to say they don’t exist. To discover exactly how French battalions functioned in the attack on Hougoumont probably needs going back to the primary sources describing it, but I suspect that the answer is ‘nobody knows’. I would not be at all surprised if it was a situation for which the French were largely unprepared, for which they had no tactical drills and just cuffed it on the day – but that is just my speculation. I think the Zulus were every bit as organised and tactically astute as the French. 😀

Iain - I can not say what formation they were in or how many, but a group of French soldiers made it into the Formal Gardena and fought there for a while before being overwhelmed.

Bob

I would like to add that this question relates to additional events, and even connects to Bob Burnham's two-rank file formation question. Believe it or not !

they wouldn't have attacked like Zulu's - at least I was under the impression they did wear French uniforms, or in modern terms combat dress or battle field dress uniform, also they were equippend with a smoothbore musket. Now what is a French support platoon - to get terminology right? In French a peloton is an equalized company and therefore stands for the use of a tactical formation in contrast to a company, half a peloton was called a section. What has Andrew Field to say it in his series of books from the French perspective? I would agree that the French were not stupid, but elite solders? I would say average. An assault platoon whatever this is, forgive my utter ignorance of modern military jargon, as such did not exist, or do you mean a forlorne hope?

Answering that question will allow for an aproximate evaluation concerning numbers making up the assault platoon. (2nd Bn. 2nd Régiment d'Infanterie de Ligne)