Zamoyski in the introduction to his biography of Napoleon has some interesting insights:
"In the half-century before Napoleon came to power, a titanic struggle for dominion saw the British acquire Canada, large swathes of India, and a string of colonies and aspire to lay down the law at sea; Austria grab provinces in Italy and Poland; Prussia increase in size by two-thirds; and Russia push her frontier 600 kilometres into Europe and occupy large areas of Central Asia, Siberia, and Alaska, laying claims as far afield as California. Yet George III, Maria Theresa, Frederick William II, and Catherine II are not generally accused of being megalomaniac monsters and compulsive warmongers.
Napoleon is frequently condemned for his invasion of Egypt, while the British occupation which followed (...) is not."
For Charles Esdaile the Napoleonic Wars started in 1803, and Napoleon bore the entire responsibility:
"Let us begin by discussing what we mean when we say the Napoleonic Wars. Hostilities broke out on 18 May 1803 when Britain, pushed beyond endurance by repeated acts of aggression and hostility, declared war on France and her new ruler, the so-called First Consul, Napoleon Bonaparte." (from the introduction of his Napoleon's Wars)
If Napoleon can be considered a warmonger because he responded to aggression by Great Britain in 1803, Austria and Russia in 1805, Prussia and Russia in 1806 and 1807 and Austria again in 1809, then I would think that a new definition of 'warmonger' should be considered.
His enjoyment and pure pleasure to wage war is more than often hinted by his contemporaries, such as Rapp.
"Zamoyski’s comments are just engaging in whataboutery." I love it! But isn't the proper term "howaboutism"? Note: engage grinning device.
It is better in my view to consider this from Napoleon’s point of view. As he took a rather pragmatic, if short-term, view of what was good for him, then it becomes clearer. Obviously he did not start it, but he knew it was his opportunity as chaotic situations create far more opportunities than stable ones. He also understood, ahead of most people, what we would call the celebrity culture.
So, 1796 clearly gives him a job to do, taking over really as a political appointee with experienced commanders and an effective intelligence network. By November, Clarke is supposed to tbe opening peace negotiations with Austria, but Napoleon does his best to delay him, so that Mantua can fall and he can win a glorious victory to establish his name among the populace.
The tripnto Egypt made him equally exotic and daring while striking a blow at GB, which he could not do from the Channel coast. Lots of scientists and reports in the papers, followed by planting news of his victory at Aboukir. Back in Paris as First Consul, he needs a victory, so he tells Talleyrand to spin out the negotiations while he prepares and tells the French people he wants peace.
Then he continues the war war by refusing to comply with his treaty obligations under Luneville and empties the piggy bank to build his army at Boulogne. This is where he loses control of the situation - unsurprisingly, UK seeks allies to remove the direct threat and who are mistrustful of his intentions. By November, the Bank of France is almost bust, so he needs victory to get some cash. Late in the day, Prussia sees the reality of his expansionism, which he cannot stop himself, so war breaks out but this time, Tilsit does not bring the cash. By 1808, his regime is running out of money due to its military expenditure, so off he goes to grab Portugal and then fearing the loss of the Spanish subsidy, takes that. So it goes on until crushing defeat at Leipzig and abdication,
Then, like some soap actor, who left for other projects, he has one last go and fails.
So, warmonger is too loaded a term, but his own character made it pretty well inevitable, especially when economic reality hit.
Wisely spoken, so I think this Discussion can be closed! 😉
I think its important to recognise, as you have pointed out there, that there were breaches in both directions. Was Britain as bad as Napoleon? In a number of respects, yes it was. But equally he wasn't 'War shy', and probably saw it as an opportunity - after all he was good at it. So it wasn't all his fault, but equally he wasn't the man of peace that some have claimed (Spain, Russia, 1815 all spring to mind, though we have discussed these in some depth elsewhere).