Were Metternich's Peace Ouvertures in 1813 Genuine?

@Mo Cheikh As it is 40 years ago this week that I started at UCL, I suppose I should start with Rady. He will actually be in SEES, now into UCL, but it stands for the School of East European and Slavic Studies. You can see from his biog that he is really an adherent of theceastern European view. While any book on Austria in English is worthwhile, the work you quote from is popular history and so, I would be reluctant to quote from it, not least as I haven’t been able to locate the source of the claim about the three letters.

I don’t see what Metternich could have done about Spain’s colonies as Austria lacked any capability in the area. Cracow was the only part of the Third Partition that Austria recovered, but it was for its strategic importance and to stop it falling into Prussian or Russian hands. It is not true that Metternich took no interest in Polish wishes as in 1830, he did offer to help Polish rebels and risk war with Russia, if Archduke Charles was made king. This goes back to Austria not wanting to get directly involved in Poland and preferring a buffer state, but the collapse of the kingdom in the 1790s made this no easy task.

There de interesting parallels between the 1813 negotiations and the current Brexit version. One side is thinking long term, but has many conflicting internal pressures, but with the benefit of a wily civil servant. On the other is a rather unstable state relying on nationalism and led by a regime of sycophants supporting a leader, who thinks too much in terms of his own short-term interests and legacy to history. It finishes up in a lot of rancour and posturing with judgement being rather coloured by nationalism on one side.

It was probably inevitable that Napoleon‘s regime did work in the short-term as it was unstable simply because it was a new regime with no established continuity. However, Napoleon did rely too much on his own interests and short-term needs. In 1796, he was doing his level best to obstruct Clarke, who was supposed to be opening peace negotiations in November. Napoleon needed a decisive victory ((Rivoli) and the fall of Mantua to establish his position - see the start of Zamoyski. He claimed to be seeking a negotiated peace in 1800, when actually preparing for war to establish his rule in France, but he did have the sense not to do much beyond confirming Campo Formio at the Peace of Luneville. However, by making his regime dependent on military prowess, he set off forces that he ultimately could not control.

France had not had much involvement in Germany, so moving into the vacuum created by Austria’s withdrawal inevitably maintained friction with Austria and created newcfriction with Prussia. However Napoleon’s problem was financing his army, especially given that British sea power had cut off both his colonial revenues and Spain’s ability to pay the subsidy, so he started looking for new sources of revenue, including the annexation of Piedmont in 1802. His failure to withdraw from Holland and Switzerland led to the collapse of the Peace of Amiens and his only response was to flog Louisiana to pay for another big army. Even then the Bank of France was on the edge of bankruptcy in November 1805. So, with this short-term thinking, he becomes embroiled in Spain and invades Russia. Those in Austria, who felt that France was a manageable problem or even a potential ally in 1801 knew thit could not go on. So, they went along with Roosevelt’s slogan of talking softly, but wielding a big stick.

That is why Austria did not get involved in the spring 1813 fighting, where Napoleon did much to stabilise his own position. However, Metternich was dealing with a gambler now, who believed that just one more spin of the wheel would bring success and restore his position. This can be seen in in his attempts to win and try to accept Metternich’s proposals only when the strategic situation had moved against him. Napoleon’s other key failing. which afflicts Brexiteers, is a failure to consider the other side’s position and objectives. This is a key skill in negotiation as it enables you to identify where movement is possible to reach a settlement. He like Johnson could only see negotiation in terms of victory/defeat and how it served his own position. It is tough to reach a settlement with someone, who thinks like that. Austria would have agreed to France retaining the “natural frontiers” to keep a useful ally in power and at full strength, but it was not enough for Napoleon’s ambitions.

Speaking of Brexiteers, that clown Andrew Roberts has reviewed Siemann’s book. Only an ill-informed Brexiteer could come up with his conclusion. https://newcriterion.com/issues/2019/11/metternichs-strength-in-law