Napoleonica La Revue n°51 (2024/4)
Table of contents (in english, full-text article in the french version)
https://shs.cairn.info/journal-napoleonica-la-revue-2024-4?lang=en
The logistical requirement increases with the technical level of the weapons and equipment used (and therefore more generally, with the technological level of the period or civilization considered). An infantry division (of 12,000 men) under the First Empire required daily support of around 10 tons, but 50 were needed in 1870 and 650 in 1944 (case of the North American division during the European campaign). As this evolution has continued, we can currently consider that logistics has changed status to become a category in its own right of military action, in the same way as operations or tactics, whereas in the Napoleonic period (as in previous periods), it was still only a practice at their service. Alexander, Caesar, Charles XII or Napoleon, at the head of technologically uncomplex armies, could therefore legitimately consider logistics as a partial adjustment variable: their soldiers were indeed capable of temporarily withstanding a certain number of deprivations. This is no longer really the case today, where the complexity of equipment (and its maintenance) reduces the resilience of the military tool and in return causes a considerable reduction in the share held by the combat function. The way of waging war reflects as much a technological level as an era and a culture.