In the second instalment of the 8 episode odyssey of 'Napoleon month', I spoke to Dr William Fletcher (King's College, London) about Napoleon's style as a commander both tactically and strategically, and discuss where credit is due, and has been unfairly given. You can also watch the interview of this episode on Youtube.
I am agreeing with Dr. Fletcher that his best campaign was his 1st Italian one.
He had to take over an army, which he couldn't shape that much and defeat two opponents - Sardinia and Austria - and he had not that experience in the art of operational art of war and running an army.
As already written in another thread the best books about Nabulieone's art of war are those by Stéphane Béraud, whose third volume is overdue - hopefully he hasn't died and fulfills his project of 4 volumes on that topic.
Later he is able to tailor the army to his needs and operational art of war, and that is where he was best, when it gets too big, form 1812 onward he fails because he cannot step op the operational art of war into army groups, one of the reasons that due to his sheer dominance no other talented general would be able to command armies (with the exception of Moreau in 1800, where two theatres of war - Germany and Italy - were waged by two different commanders).
Nabulieone's style of war stifled the once talented generals - whereas Moreau due to his more liberal style of command produced them, Leval - Lewal, Jules-Louis (1823-1908). Auteur du texte. Études de
guerre. 1 / par le colonel Lewal,.... 1873-1879. - volume on page 17 discusses this topic well.
So we see his other great campaigns whenever he has tight control over an army which is not too big and not spread over a huge area, 1805 - 1806/07, the Danube campaign of 1809 and the ever so often forgotten spring campaign of 1813.
1814 is cherished ever so often - because he can wage war with a small army which executes his direct commands. I am maybe the only one who is not impressed by this campaign, where aside of winning unimportant victories he is loosing all operational goals and when his usual past successful manoeuvre to the rear back fires badly, because Blücher mainly, is not waging war as the Allied did in campaigns prior to that.
Interestingly he fails so badly in 1815 - compared to his first Italian campaign. Instead of fighting it in his usual corps system war he creates two wings, and neither one of them is strong enough to win a decisive victory, whereas in 1796 he finishes of first the Sardinians and then the Austrians.
And yes he was a war monger, he loved it and Rapp told this to him in 1815.