KGL Organisation during the Waterloo campaign

Just reading Thomas : No Want of Courage, the British Army in Flanders 1793 - 95, also here a Flank Battalion was formed out of the three Guards battalions.

By the way one of the best books I did ever read - in case it goes on like this it will be among my top 50 books.

Thanks Brendan,

I wasn't aware of the British practice of creating rifle platoons in the AWI (I clearly need to do more reading on that as well). I think it is interesting that the British seem to have made less use of separate grenadier battalions than most other European nations. It suggests that the idea of the need for 'heavy infantry' was starting to fall out of favour (at least on the battlefield - I don't know whether the British favoured using grenadier companies when storming fortifications and built-up areas).

There were flank battalions formed at Minorca for the Maida campaign in 1806, but the latest I can find were those used at Barossa in 1811; I don't recall reading of any being established in Canada or NW Europe in 1814. From studying the practice, it appears to have remained in use where an independent force - usually a smallish one - had no obvious "reserve" (eg one or more elite battalions), and therefore one had to be created.

I think Oudinot's formation was created from the flank companies of the depot battalions; the French employed a similar formation in one of the early actions against the British in the Peninsula (Vimiero?). made up of the flank companies of battalions that had been detached as garrisons during the conquest of Spain the previous year.

Further to Hans-Karl's comment on the 1809 Prussians and Saxons, it appears to have been quite common - certainly in the 1809 campaign - for the schutzen of Bavarian formations (particularly those from the two battalions of each line regiment) to be gathered together, and within that grouping the rifle-armed scharfschutzen would commonly be extracted from each schutzen detachment and joined together as a sort of "point platoon". This was not dis-simlar to the British practice in the AWI of taking the rifle-armed men (typically 5 or 6 in total) from each light company, and forming them into a dedicated platoon under an enterprising subaltern in order to provide each Light Battalion a large-ish force of riflemen. Whilst it isn't a startling tactical innovation, given the number of German officers who served in the AWI and were quite senior by the start of the Napoleonic Wars, it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that the grouping of schutzen came from observing this practice. Perhaps Hans-Karl has some evidence for or against this?

I see Hans was on the ball here.

FYI - similar instructions exist for the French in 1792 for their grenadiers. In an arrangement remarkably like those of Wellington. I have found the implication of the same practice for the voltigeurs, but I am not aware of a specific instruction. Napoleon's instruction for the revision to a 6-company structure seems to assume the grenadiers and voltigeurs would be separated regularly. So, this grouping appears to have been the norm in the French Army.

You may want to look over Rod's site - many other useful details on the British Army. Another useful item from Rod is https://rodwargaming.wordpress.com/miltary-historical-research/organisation/authorised-establishments-of-the-british-army-1802-1815/.

Yes, thank you H-K!

Thank you Hans-Karl,

That is fascinating stuff. I clearly need to do a lot more reading.

Best wishes

Stephen

Thanks Scott,

That's really useful. I wasn't aware of the practice of forming light battalions out of the light companies of a brigade when in action. Was this a common practice during the Peninsular War?

Best wishes

Stephen

A useful source is Glover G, The Waterloo Archive, vol 5 German Sources. documents 11, 15.

The change in KGL from 10 to 6 companies was made in the General Order of 9th May 1815. In addition, Wellington reconfirmed the practice of consolidating all light companies in each brigade into a single light battalion when in action.

Document 11 (Lieutenant Dehnel) notes all "rifle companies" of the 1,2,3, and 4th Bn are consolidated. So, it appears that all men in light companies were rifle-armed at this time.

Note some battalions in the Anglo-Netherlands force formed in pairs during the battle, i.e. the squares being formed by two battalions. In which case each pair of KGL battalions would have had 5 companies or 10 in the pair forming a square. Perhaps this may explain how they managed the differences in subunits wrt drill formations.

Regards

Scott

Thanks Brendan,

That's really useful. How differing sizes of bodies of men managed to move and change formation (and do it under fire) has always been something of a mystery to me. It is also a wonder to me how the officers and NCOs managed to divide a diminishing battalion in to the correct sized sub-units in order to manoeuvre on the day of battle. They were obviously a lot better at maths than I am!

Best wishes

Stephen

For sure they would have to practise this on the drill ground and would have found a practical solution to do so.

I'd prefer to leave any/all definitive answers to the drill-book questions to someone better versed in that line of research, but off the top of my head, I would say that the basic drill commands would be the same. Essentially, you are looking at a half battalion (grenadiers and four centre companies) instead of a whole one, and most units would have practiced forming reduced columns and other formations.

In terms of forming square, the logical answer (yes, I know - "logic" and "British Army" are rarely seen in the same sentence) would be one centre company to each side, grenadiers reinforcing the corners, or as a central reserve, and the lights patrolling the inside looking for "opportunity shots" - assuming they weren't forming their own "light battalion square" with the other units' light companies. (Actually, that's a good point - what did each brigade's ad hoc light battalion do in situations such as the massed enemy cavalry charges at Waterloo?)

In terms of company size, sub-unit formations would be equalised, usually at the start of the campaign, but if not then certainly on the day of battle, to provide a regular "shape" to the battalion and guarantee that if, say, a company had to be detached, they were all roughly the same size and could occupy the same amount of ground. Flank companies tended to be kept up to strength on almost a day-to-day basis anyway, so would certainly have started the campaign at "full strength" (whatever that was deemed to be at the time). By the early 1800s, neither flank company was performing actions that would have been unfamiliar to the men of the centre companies as well, so other than the use of rifles, no further training would have been necessary.

Hope that helps.

Thanks Brendan,

Would the reduction in the number of companies have had any effect on the way the battalion was handled in the field? Would a six company battalion need to use a different drill book (for forming square, moving from column to line etc) than a ten company battalion?

And if men weren't transferred to the grenadier or light companies does this mean that companies could be of different sizes within the same battalion.

Best wishes

Stephen

Hi Stephen,

I'm not sure at what exact point this re-organisation took place (I had it in my head that it was several months prior to Waterloo). Given that the average battalion strength for Platt's brigade was about 450 all ranks, and that for Ompteda's about 400 (ie an average of 65-75 men per company under the new regime), I very much doubt that many men were forced to become a grenadier or "light bob". Bear in mind also, that half the light company in each Line battalion was rifle-armed, which would require some extra training and equipment to be issued. Given the nature of flank company service and the potential for higher casualty rates, I would suspect that the regimental tailors probably had a stock of spare wings etc ready to issue to any lucky lad elevated to their ranks!

The Army had "previous" for this sort of thing - near the end of the AWI, line infantry battalions (certainly all of those in North America) were reduced from ten to six companies, to make allowance for the limited manpower available.

BM